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Summary 
This paper analyses optimal investments in innovation when dealing with a stringent 
climate target and with the uncertain effectiveness of R&D. The innovation needed to 
achieve the deep cut in emissions is modelled by a backstop carbon-free technology 
whose cost depends on R&D investments. To better represent the process of 
technological progress, we assume that R&D effectiveness is uncertain. By means of a 
simple analytical model, we show how accounting for the uncertainty that characterizes 
technological advancement yields higher investments in innovation and lower policy 
costs. We then confirm the results via a numerical analysis performed with a stochastic 
version of WITCH, an energy-economy-climate model. The results stress the 
importance of a correct specification of the technological change process in economy-
climate models. 
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Technological change is an uncertain phenomenon. In its most thriving form,
groundbreaking innovation is so unpredictable that any attempt to model the
uncertain processes that govern it is close to impossible. Despite the complex-
ities, research dealing with long-term processes, such as climate change, would
largely beneﬁt from incorporating the uncertainty of technological advance. Yet,
bringing uncertainty into models has proved particularly diﬃcult, especially for
what concerns technological change, see Clarke and Weyant [6].
On a more general level, the challenge of modelling endogenous techno-
logical change in all its features, including randomness, becomes increasingly
important when dealing with the analysis of stringent climate targets. Many
energy-economy models have been used to perform cost eﬀectiveness of climate
policies. Not surprisingly, the related literature has produced a dispersed range
of costs estimates for these policies, resting on the diﬀerent formulations and
assumptions that stand behind each model. Nonetheless, one core fact upon
which everyone seems to agree is the role of technological change in shaping
those costs, see for example the summary of an updated modeling comparison
exercise on innovation in Grubb, Carraro and Schellnhuber [7].
The recognition of the relevance of this issue has led researchers to model
technological change as an endogenous process, although typically in a deter-
ministic fashion. The existing literature accounting for uncertainty has mostly
concentrated on the uncertainty aﬀecting climate damages and abatement costs,
as well as other parameters, such as the discount factor. Within this framework,
few studies have looked at the consequences of climate uncertainty on innova-
tion. In particular, Baker, Clarke and Weyant [1] investigate the eﬀects of
climate uncertainty on R&D investments, to verify whether innovation serves
as a hedge against uncertainty, but ﬁnd no unambiguous answer: optimal R&D
might increase or decrease with uncertainty depending on a variety of factors
regarding the speciﬁcation of technological change and uncertainty.
However, as noted above, little focus has been devoted to the analysis of the
intrinsic uncertainty of innovation, and how uncertainty might change results
and policy recommendations. Baker and Adu-Bonnah [2] is the only case to
our knowledge that tackles this issue in the context of climate change∗. They
analyze how optimal R&D investments change with the risk-proﬁle of the R&D
program and with climate uncertainty. They diﬀerentiate between two types of
technologies, and ﬁnd that technological speciﬁcation and climate damages are
key in the role played by uncertainty.
The current paper delves into the issue of uncertain technological progress
when a climate obligation is in place. In particular, we seek to analyze diﬀerent
optimal responses in terms of investments and climate policy costs when we
model innovation as a backstop technology characterized by either a determin-
istic or an uncertain process. To this scope, we ﬁrst develop a simple analytical
model. Then, we augment the hybrid integrated assessment model WITCH,
∗Outside the climate change literature, the theory of investment under uncertainty and the
real option literature has been extensevely applied to study R&D investments.
2introduced in Bosetti, Carraro, Galeotti, Massetti and Tavoni [4], to incorpo-
rate a carbon-free backstop technology whose cost is currently not competitive
but can be lowered by investing in innovation in the form of R&D. The R&D
outcome is modeled as uncertain, and we thus devise a stochastic version of the
model to account for this eﬀect. We restrict our analysis to a climate policy of
450 ppmv stabilization.
Both our analytical and numerical results show how accounting for the un-
certainty of technological advancement yields higher investments in innovation
aimed to decrease the abatement costs via a backstop technology. The analytical
set-up provides an unequivocal relation between the uncertainty and innovation
eﬀort, and the richness of the numerical model a thorough representation of the
impacts in terms of technological change. The ﬁndings of this paper stress the
importance of a correct speciﬁcation of technological change in economy-climate
models when assessing the optimal level of R&D investments as well as the cost
of a climate policy. Our results are in line with Baker and Adu-Bonnah [2],
although in our case the results are independent of the climate target.
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section we devise a simple
toy model, and present the ﬁrst analytical insights. Section 3 deals with the
implementation of uncertain technological change in the WITCH model, and
shows the numerical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 A simple model of uncertain innovation
We start by sketching a simple analytical model. We consider the problem of a
social planner facing a two-period, two-technologies, environmental regulation
problem. Given a target level of abatement to be undertaken during the second
period, the planner can choose a combination of two carbon-free technologies:
a traditional technology (say nuclear) and an advanced, backstop technology.
Abatement costs with the backstop technology are initially higher than with the
traditional one, but can be reduced by investing in R&D during the ﬁrst period.
We introduce uncertainty by modeling the R&D outcome on the abatement
cost of the backstop technology as uncertain: the innovation eﬀort leads to a
central value reduction in abatement costs with a given probability p, and to
lower and higher abatement costs states with probability
(1−p)
2 , respectively in
each case†. The high cost state represents the failure of the R&D program:
abatement costs are not reduced by the innovation eﬀort, and remain higher
than the traditional carbon-free technology costs for any level of abatement. In
this case, the planner chooses not to operate the backstop technology, because
it is too costly, and resorts to the, cheaper, traditional technology. The low cost
state represents an over than expected success of the R&D program: backstop
technology costs are always lower than in the central case, the lower the costs
the higher the abatement needed.
†Diﬀerent probability distributions for the states of nature can also be considered, but are
omitted here for the sake of simplicity without any loss of generality.
3The objective of the social planner is to choose the optimal level of invest-
ment in innovation, together with abatement shares in both traditional and
backstop technologies, such that expected total costs are minimized subject to
a given level of abatement. Formally:
min
I
C(I) + Ew[ min
µT,µB
(CT(µT) + C(µB,I,w)] (1)
s.t. µT + µB = µ µT,µB,I ≥ 0
where I,µT,µB are respectively the innovation eﬀort (i.e. investment in
R&D) and the abatement in the traditional and backstop technologies. C,CT,CB
are the respective cost functions. w represents the uncertain eﬀectiveness of
R&D. µ is the exogenously set abatement target.
To simplify the problem, let’s assume the backstop technology takes value
CB(µB,I) with probability p, while with probability
1−p
2 R&D is more eﬀective





2 cases, R&D fails, and the costs of backstop technology are not
modiﬁed by innovation (and are equal to CH
B (µH
B)). As stated earlier, the main
scope of our analysis is to compare the certain formulation (case where p = 1)
vis à vis the most uncertain one (case where p = 0). In order to make these two
cases equivalent, we equate the central case cost function to the mean between
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B = µ µi
T,µi
B,I ≥ 0 i = C,L,H
Solving the problem backward and labeling with * the optimal values for the
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4where the third term in brackets, the optimal cost in the case the R&D





One of the questions we are interested in tackling with this set up is the
eﬀect of uncertainty on the environmental obligation costs.
RESULT 1. We ﬁnd that modeling R&D eﬀectiveness as having an uncertain
outcome has a negative eﬀect on the policy costs, that is uncertainty diminishes
the costs of complying to an environmental target such as the stabilization of
CO2 atmospheric concentrations. For the algebra underlying this result, we refer
the reader to Appendix A. This ﬁnding stresses that neglecting the uncertainty
that characterizes R&D eﬀectiveness overestimates the costs of environmental
policies.
Another -more complex- issue we seek to investigate is the eﬀect of uncer-
tainty on the behavior of investments in R&D , i.e. we ask ourselves what is the
sign of dI∗
dp . If dI∗
dp < 0 then we have that R&D investments increase with uncer-
tainty. This would imply that modeling R&D as having an uncertain outcome,
a fact often believed to be the case, would yield a share of innovation higher
than if uncertainty were neglected. In Appendix B we prove that investigating
the sign of dI∗
dp coincides with comparing marginal beneﬁts of innovation for
diﬀerent levels of abatement:
MBC(µC∗
B ) − MBC(µL∗
B ) ≶ 0 ?
The equation confronts the marginal beneﬁt of innovation in the central case
computed for levels of abatement resulting from the central and low cost cases,
µ∗
B and µL∗
B ; its sign depends on how the marginal beneﬁt of R&D changes
with the level of abatement. In this paper we restrict our attention to the case
of innovation lowering the marginal abatement costs for every level of abate-
ment‡. Thus, marginal beneﬁts weakly increase with abatement. Therefore,
since abatement in the low case is always higher than (or at least equal to) the
abatement in the central case (µL∗
B ≥ µC∗
B ), we ﬁnd that dI∗
dp ≤ 0, which lead us
to the second result.
RESULT 2. We assume that marginal beneﬁts of innovation increase with
abatement. Then, for interior solutions, investments in innovation increase
with uncertainty. Conversely, innovation is the same regardless of uncertainty
for the case µL∗
B = µC∗
B = µ, the corner solution implying that the traditional
technology is never employed when innovation is productive. In addition, this
latter result also holds when marginal beneﬁts of innovation are constant with
abatement, for example when innovation shifts down the abatement curve by a
constant.
Ruling out the last two special cases, the intuition for the result is the fol-
lowing. Let us concentrate on the two extreme cases of zero uncertainty, i.e.
the central case is always achieved (p = 1), and full uncertainty, i.e. R&D
has either full success or full failure with 50% chance each (p = 0). Choosing
‡This directly follows from the choice of investigating R&D eﬀorts reducing the costs of a
backstop, carbon-free, technology, as discussed in detail later in the paper.
5the optimal level of R&D investments implies equating the marginal costs of
generating innovation with the marginal beneﬁts of decreasing the abatement
costs. When confronting the two cases, we should compare the marginal ben-
eﬁts of innovation for the central value (zero uncertainty) and low value (full
uncertainty). The latter has half the chances of occurring, but marginal beneﬁts
are by construction twice those of the central case, so that the fraction due to
the probability cancels out. However, since the share of abatement using the
backstop technology is higher in the low value case and assuming that marginal
beneﬁts increase with the level of abatement, marginal beneﬁts of innovation
are higher with full uncertainty than with no uncertainty. That is, innovation
is more productive when its outcome is explicitly modelled as uncertain.
How does this ﬁnding translate into real life considerations ? First, one has
to bear in mind that the social planner can pick from a variety of technologies
to achieve an environmental target, say, to reduce CO2 emissions. Investing
in R&D is a risky procedure. However, if the investment falls through the
resort to existing technologies would still limit the costs of abatement. If the
investment in R&D is successful, the beneﬁts would be higher than would have
been in the central case. This payoﬀ asymmetry is such that the upside of super
productive innovation outweighs the downside of failure. Hence, in the presence
of innovative technologies, a risk-neutral planner would choose to invest more
when R&D outcome is uncertain.
Our set-up and results are similar to those in Baker and Adu-Bonnah [2].
They too ﬁnd that the relation between uncertainty and innovation depends on
whether marginal beneﬁts of R&D increase or decrease with the level of abate-
ment. Even though the sign of this relationship is in principle ambiguous, this
ambiguity depends on what technology is under consideration (see Baker, Shittu
and Clarke[3]). R&D aimed at cleaner and more eﬃcient carbon technologies
has increasing marginal beneﬁts for moderate emissions reductions; however,
this positive eﬀect decreases and eventually drops to zero as the game gets
tougher and stringent emission reductions have to be met. A diﬀerent story
holds for carbon-free technologies, where the eﬀect of R&D is that of lowering
the marginal cost curves for any level of abatement. So the issue of ambiguity in
the sign could be interpreted more practically as: what type of technologies is
technical change aﬀecting in the model? When large emission cuts are at stake,
carbon technologies have a lower margin for eﬃcient improvement than carbon-
free technologies (i.e. nuclear, renewables, carbon-free backstop) which would
play a major role. In this case marginal beneﬁts of innovation are increasing
with the level of abatement. Conversely, in the case of moderate climate policy,
eﬃciency improvement would play a relevant role. But again, in this case mar-
ginal beneﬁts of innovation would hardly decrease in the range of abatement
under consideration, given the small mitigation eﬀort required. This argument
justiﬁes the increasing marginal beneﬁts assumption that is behind our results.
In contrast with Baker and Adu-Bonnah [2], our result is independent of
how stringent the climate target might be. Since the productivity gain from the
low cost case is always twice that of the central case, the upside of an uncertain
program outweighs the downside, notwithstanding the level of abatement. In
6the limit case when abatement is totally achieved by the backstop technology in
both central and low cost cases, then uncertainty would not aﬀect the optimal
choice of R&D.
3 Numerical analysis
In this section we turn to the numerical analysis of the model. In order to
investigate the role of uncertain technological change, we devise a version of
the energy-economy-climate model WITCH featuring an R&D driven carbon-
free backstop technology. Innovation can lower the price of this otherwise non
competitive technology, but it is modeled in a stochastic setting in order to ac-
count for the uncertainty of the R&D outcome. We ﬁrst introduce the backstop
technology sector and then discuss numerical results for diﬀerent simulation
experiments.
3.1 Uncertain backstop technology in WITCH
WITCH -World Induced Technical Change Hybrid model- is an integrated as-
sessment model for the analysis of climate change and energy issues. For a
detailed description of the model see Bosetti, Carraro, Galeotti, Massetti and
Tavoni [4] and Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni [5]. It is a regional model featur-
ing an inter-temporal optimal growth top-down part that is hard linked with a
bottom-up like description of the energy sector. The energy sector is described
by nested constant elasticity of substitution functions which describe the trans-
formation of primary energy carriers into ﬁnal energy services. World regions
strategically interact in a game theoretic set-up by playing an open-loop Nash
game on global externalities. Technological change is endogenous and acts both
via energy eﬃciency R&D and learning-by-doing in power capacity. The model
is solved numerically with GAMS/CONOPT.
The non-cooperative baseline predicts global CO2 emissions to reach around
20 GtC by 2100, a ﬁgure in line with IPCC B2 SRES scenarios. These ﬁgures
show how the free-riding incentives that characterize global stock externalities
such as CO2 make it diﬃcult to achieve substantial emission reduction in a
cost beneﬁt analysis setting. Concerns over the risk of prolonged emissions put
forward by climatologists and specialized bodies such as the IPCC justify the
resort to cost eﬀectiveness analysis of given climate goals. In this paper we
focus on the speciﬁc target of stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentration to 450
ppmv (550 ppmv CO2equivalent) by 2100, a target probabilistically associated
with that of maintaining within 2◦C the global temperature increase above pre-
industrial level.
As evident from Figure 1, a climate policy of this kind entails signiﬁcant
emission reductions: for example, an emission path respecting the 450 ppmv
target would curb emissions by 50% in 2030, and up to 85% by the end of the
century. Such a scenario is clearly challenging, and will probably come at a cost
in terms of economic growth, without adequate technological advancement.




















Figure 1: CO2 emissions in the BAU and 450ppmv cases
For example, simulations using the WITCH model show that on the basis
of currently existing technologies the stabilization eﬀort would lead to a power
generation mix such as the one shown in Figure 2. Three technologies are
believed to provide the low/zero carbon electricity indispensable in such a severe
mitigation scenario. First, early deployment of advanced coal combined with
CCS to achieve some of the needed reductions of emissions. Second, nuclear
power that would become the predominant technology by mid century, with
almost half of the electricity share. Finally, renewables, expected to signiﬁcantly
contribute from the second half of the century. In addition to this, given the
comparatively greater diﬃculty in cutting emissions in the non-electricity sector,
R&D-driven energy saving will also be indispensable.
A stabilization scenario of this kind appears extremely ambitious, for a va-
riety of reasons. First, it would imply considerable costs, quantiﬁable in a net
present value output loss of around 3.3%. Second, current technologies face
many constraints. A massive deployment of nuclear energy would entail in-
creased waste management costs and proliferation risks: the lack of resolution
of these problems -for instance through technological advances- means the sce-
nario will unlikely develop. Similarly, the high land use demand of currently
available renewables technologies in power generation, constitutes a serious chal-
lenge for the penetration target needed to stabilize at 450 ppmv. Unavoidably,
any stringent stabilization scenario will call for innovation in non-carbon energy
technologies. Conceiving future energy scenarios depending on such backstop
technologies would mean to focus on the crucial role of R&D investments as the
8Figure 2: Power generation shares in the 450ppmv stabilization case. From top
to bottom: nuclear, hydro, oil, gas, Trad. Coal, Advanced Coal + CCS, Wind
& Solar.
9main impulse fostering the required technological innovation.
To enhance the technology feature in WITCH, we introduce a R&D backstop
technology. We model it as a power generation technology, that emits zero car-
bon per unit of electricity and is renewable in the sense it doesn’t rely on rapidly
exhaustible natural resources. It could be thought of as a ground-breaking in-
novation such as fusion power, or more likely as a portfolio of advanced versions
of technologies such as advanced solar power, new nuclear etc. We assume this
representative technology to be currently uneconomical, but that its cost can
be decreased by means of investments in innovation. Speciﬁcally, the invest-
ment cost for building a unit of power capacity ($/kW), ICback, depends on
cumulated R&D, KR&Dback, via a power formulation as follows:
ICback(n,t) =
ICback(n,0)
(1 + KR&Dback(t,n))η (5)
i.e. at time t, for region n, the investment cost decreases with the R&D
capital depending on the learning parameter η.§ The capital depreciates with
rate δ and can be increased by investing in knowledge IR&Dback through an
innovation possibility frontier of this kind:




The presence of the stock in the possibility frontier ensures the "standing on
shoulders" eﬀect, and the exponents b and c sum up to less than one to model
diminishing returns to research. Such a formulation has received empirical sup-
port for energy innovation by Popp [9]. To model the high social returns of
R&D, the positive externality of knowledge creation is accounted for by assum-
ing that the return on energy R&D investment is four times higher than the
one in physical capital, as originally proposed by Nordhaus [8]. At the same
time, the opportunity cost of crowding out other forms of R&D is obtained by
subtracting four dollars of private investment from the physical capital stock for
each dollar of R&D crowded out by energy R&D. The crowd out parameter is
set equal to 0.5 as in Popp [9].
We assume that the backstop technology enters as a linear substitute of
nuclear power in the energy sector nest; in this way we allow the new technology
to displace the technology that most controversially contributed to carbon-free
energy generation in the original formulation of the model; at the same time the
nested CES structure of the electricity sector with higher than unity elasticities
consents the phase out of all other power generation plants, although at a higher
cost than would have otherwise happened assuming linear relations. To account
for the industrialization lag that stands between research and commercialization,
the backstop technology is assumed to be available from 2050 onwards only, even
though we will test our result also for diﬀerent entry periods.
§In this ﬁrst application learning occurs indipendently at a regional level. As a future
extension of the model we plan to include international spillovers of knowledge.
10Our primary interest in this paper is to analyze the eﬀect of modeling un-
certainty on the level of investments and on the costs of the policy. In the
preceding section we have shown what are the insights from a simpliﬁed model.
We now extend this analysis to the numerical optimization set up by modeling
the outcome of the R&D investments as uncertain: thus ICback(n,t,w) also
depends on the state of the world, w. We assume that the eﬀectiveness of R&D
on decreasing the backstop costs can turn out to be either of the three following
cases: in the "best" case (w = b) the investment cost of the backstop decreases
with R&D as shown in (5); in the "failure" case (w = f) the investment cost of
the backstop remains the same as the initial one, notwithstanding the level of
investments. This R&D failure case is equivalent to assume that the learning
parameter η is equal to zero. Both these low and high cost states have the
probability of occurring
1−p
2 each. In the "central" case (w = c), with remain-
ing p chances, the investment cost is the average of the two limit cases. To
summarize:
1−p
2 : ICback(n,t,b) =
ICback(n,0)
(1+KR&Dback(t,n))η






2 : ICback(n,t,f) = ICback(n,0)
(7)
This framework mimics the toy model presented in the previous section and
allows to control for the eﬀect of R&D uncertainty. We can run the model for
diﬀerent values of p -the probability of the central case- and evaluate the con-
sequences of uncertainty on innovation. In order to include in the model these
concomitant alternative scenarios we develop an implicit¶ stochastic version of
the WITCH model. All model variables, previously deﬁned on regions, time
and scenarios, are redeﬁned on nodes belonging to a scenarios tree as the one
depicted in Figure 3. The objective function to be maximized for each region is
not the expected utility.
3.2 Numerical results
In this section we report results from the numerical exercise carried out with
WITCH. A climate target of 450 ppmv is assumed throughout the analysis. We
confront the deterministic case with the uncertain formulation. The average
of the latter coincides with the deterministic one to ensure the equivalence of
the comparison exercise. In the uncertain formulation there is a 50% chance
to achieve the central case and a 25% chance to achieve the failure and best
cases, respectively. In accordance with the analytical analysis, we assume a risk
neutral social planner (we will then relax this assumption).
Since we are investigating the role of uncertainty on innovation, it is interest-
ing to compare the R&D investments in the stochastic case and in the equivalent
¶Instead of accounting explicitly for the non-anticipative constraints, non anticipativity
is implicitly deﬁned through characterization of predecessor/successor relationships among
nodes in the scenario tree.
11ICback (n,11_1)…
ICback (n,12_1) ICback (n,13_1)……..
ICback (n,1_1) ICback (n,12_2)  ICback (n,13_2)……..
ICback (n,12_3)  ICback (n,13_3)……..
t = 2002 …………..t = 2047  t = 2052  t = 2057……..……
ICback (n,11_1)…
ICback (n,12_1) ICback (n,13_1)……..
ICback (n,1_1) ICback (n,12_2)  ICback (n,13_2)……..
ICback (n,12_3)  ICback (n,13_3)……..
t = 2002 …………..t = 2047  t = 2052  t = 2057……..……
Figure 3: Scenario tree in the stochastic version of WITCH. Variables, as ICback
in this example, are redeﬁned depending on nodes.
deterministic case, before uncertainty is resolved in 2050. Results of investments
on innovation are presented in Figure 4; the graph shows that optimal R&D in-
vestments are always higher in the stochastic formulation with respect to the
deterministic case before the resolution of uncertainty. The numerical analysis
thus conﬁrms that modeling R&D as having an uncertain outcome induces more
innovation eﬀort, as predicted by the analytical example outlined in Section 2.
As expected, in the stochastic setting, once uncertainty is resolved, R&D is
higher for the best case than for the central, and it is zero for the failure state.
To provide an insight into what diﬀerent R&D investment paths imply in
terms of technology adoption throughout the century, in Figure 5 we show the
values of electricity generated with the backstop technology in the various cases.
From the last Figure we know that the R&D investments in the deterministic
case are low compared to the stochastic one: such a reduced innovation eﬀort
sets back the competitiveness of the backstop technology. This translates into a
lower deployment of the innovative technology in the deterministic case vis à vis
the stochastic one, as is apparent from the graph (with the obvious exception
of the R&D "failure" case).
As expected, the opposite behavior holds with regards to the existing tech-
nology competing with the backstop, i.e. nuclear power: the higher costs of the
backstop technology determine a higher nuclear power share in the deterministic
formulation than in the uncertain one (except for the failure case, see Figure
6). All in all, accounting for R&D uncertainty fosters the deployment of inno-
vative technologies such as the backstop one. Through the path dependencies
that characterize the evolution of technologies, this would act as a control on the
negative externalities that aﬀect the currently used technologies and deﬁne their
limited deployment capacity. For example, in the WITCH model we explicitly
account for waste management and proliferation risks (as well as uranium ore
costs) as a global externality countries have incentives to free-ride on. The






















































































































































Figure 5: Electricity with Backstop








































































Figure 6: Electricity with Nuclear
The other issue we are dealing with in this paper is the eﬀect of R&D un-
certainty on the costs of complying to the climate policy. Are we miscalculating
stabilization costs by neglecting uncertain eﬃcacy of innovation in fostering a
backstop technology? And, more generally, what is the role of a carbon-free
power generation technology in determining these costs?
Numerical results again conﬁrm the insights of the analytical model: policy
costs are always lower when accounting for uncertainty, reaching a 2.3% gain by
the end of the century with respect to the deterministic case. Although limited
by the presence of an existing, largely deployable, carbon-free technology, such
as the nuclear one, these cost variations indicate that modeling uncertainty
explicitly alleviates the mitigation burden of the climate policy.
In order to test for results robustness and to understand the eﬀect of key
assumptions, we have repeated simulations for a diﬀerent set of assumptions on
entry time and the level of risk aversion￿.
In Figure 7 we present the R&D results when we assume diﬀerent entry
times of the backstop technology ("early" in 2040, and "late" in 2060). The
picture shows that early resolution of uncertainty on the eﬃcacy of the R&D
programme leads to a higher level of optimal R&D investments. The contrary
￿In order to preserve the base year consumption and savings ﬁgures we have adjusted the












































































Figure 7: Eﬀect of Entry Time on Backstop R&D Investment
holds in the case of late discovery of the program’s eﬀectiveness. Although the
eﬀect on the levels of investments is signiﬁcant, entry time has a small impact
on policy costs. As noted above, this result depends on the presence of the
traditional carbon-free technology (nuclear) which has a buﬀer eﬀect.
Finally, we drop the assumption of risk neutrality and investigate what hap-
pens when the central planner is risk-averse. In this case, lower utility is at-
tached to risky investments, and thus we expect to ﬁnd an eﬀect contrary to
the results presented so far. The comparative advantage of R&D investments
under the stochastic formulation weakens with risk aversion, to a point at which
investment in R&D will be lower with uncertainty. Yet, this is not the case for
a logarithmic utility function (unit risk aversion). Incidentally this is the case
typically used in WITCH and many other economy-climate models. For such
levels of risk aversion investments are still higher in the stochastic case than in
the deterministic one, even though the diﬀerence becomes smaller as compared
to the risk neutral case results.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the issue of uncertain technological progress
within environmental regulation. This is an important research topic, although
it is poorly investigated, given the relevance of technical change in the global
15warming literature and the uncertainty that characterizes all innovation processes.
We have analyzed optimal responses to uncertainty, in terms of R&D invest-
ments and climate policy costs, by modeling innovation as a backstop technology
characterized by either a deterministic or an uncertain process. To this purpose,
we have developed a simple analytical model and modiﬁed the hybrid integrated
assessment model WITCH to account for a carbon-free backstop technology de-
pendent on uncertain R&D realizations. We have performed a stochastic cost
eﬀectiveness analysis of a CO2 stabilization policy of 450 ppmv.
Numerical results, in accordance with analytical insights, have shown how
modeling innovation in a backstop technology as an uncertain process leads to
higher optimal levels of R&D investments. A detailed representation of the
energy sector has allowed us to capture path dependency in technological evolu-
tion, and therefore to account for the consequences of diﬀerent innovation eﬀorts
on technology deployment and externality resolution. We have also shown how
uncertainty lowers climate policy costs, although the rigidity of the energy sec-
tor -characterized by long-lasting investments with limited substitutability- is
shown to constrain the contribution of a technology breakthrough solely in the
electricity sector.
To check for the robustness of the results, we have tested the need to model
R&D uncertainty as an endogenous process by letting the backstop entry time
vary. We have shown how diﬀerent timings of backstop availability aﬀect R&D
investments and policy costs in the expected direction but to a limited extent
in terms of magnitude. Finally, the role of social planner risk aversion has been
analyzed and shown to have a counterbalancing eﬀect that reduces the gap in
innovation investments with and without uncertainty.
In this ﬁrst version of the model we have not considered the possibility
of international spillover of knowledge. This is an issue that is relevant in
both policy and modeling terms, as it can induce contrasting eﬀects. We are
investigating it in a follow-up analysis. Finally, future research includes the
evaluation of innovation uncertainty on the choice of policy instruments with a
speciﬁc focus on the role of free-riding.
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Within the analytical framework sketched in Section 2 the costs of complying
to the environmental target diminish in uncertainty.
That is, labelling with V the optimal costs for the problem outlined in Equa-
tion 1, we need to show that dV
dp > 0.
































dp > 0 if
CT(µC∗












17The right hand side of the equation is the sum of the minimized costs in the
best and worst (failure) cases, respectively. Evaluating the best case function
at a diﬀerent abatement level, for instance at the one that is optimal for the










T ) + CL
B(µL∗
B ,I∗)] (11)
and thus, in order to prove (10) it suﬃces to show that:
CT(µC∗












We know that the central case abatement cost CC
B is the average of the best














Inserting this equation in the preceding one and rearranging terms we can
rewrite the condition for costs diminishing in uncertainty as:
CT(µC∗
T ) + CH
B (µC∗
B ) > CT(µ) (14)
One of the hypotheses of our model is that in the failure case the backstop
technology is not competitive, and abatement is accomplished by means of the
traditional technology only. This means that the abatement costs for the failure
case -CH
B - are always higher than the traditional technology ones computed at
full abatement - CT(µ).Thus,
CT(µC∗
T ) + CH
B (µC∗
B ) > CT(µC∗
T ) + CT(µ) > CT(µ) (15)
which proves RESULT 1.
6 Appendix B
RESULT 2.
We investigate the sign of dI
∗
dp , knowing that if dI
∗
dp < 0 then we have that
R&D investments increase with uncertainty.
We focus on the case of an interior solution for the choice variable. Then, the
















The marginal costs of innovation equate the marginal beneﬁts from reduced
abatement costs in the central and low cost cases, weighted by the probability
of occurrence of both states.

































































It is reasonable to assume convex cost functions in I (i.e. increasing marginal
costs of innovation, and decreasing marginal beneﬁts of innovation to abate-
ment); the left hand side term of the expression is then positive, and the sign
of dI∗
dp is determined by the sign of the right hand side of the last equation.
The right hand side confronts the innovation marginal beneﬁts for the central
and low cost cases. From equation (2) we know that the marginal beneﬁts in
the low cost case are twice those of the central case. We can rewrite the right

























B ) − MBC(µL∗
B ) ≶ 0?
We have obtained that the sign of dI∗
dp depends on whether marginal beneﬁts
of R&D investments are increasing with abatement or not.
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